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NOTES
FAMILY LAW-CHILD CUSTODY-A CRYOPRESERVED IN VITRO
EMBRYO Is A "CHILD" FOR DOMESTIC RELATIONS PURPOSES. Davis v.
Davis, 1989 WL 140495 (No. E-14496 Tenn. Cir. Ct. 1989).
Junior and Mary Davis were a married couple, aged thirty and
twenty-eight respectively.' During their nine-year marriage the couple
tried repeatedly, without success, to have children.' After her fifth
ectopic pregnancy 3 and upon her physician's recommendation, Mrs.
Davis underwent an operation rendering her incapable of natural
conception .
Still desirous of having children, the couple sought out Dr. Ray
King of the Fertility Center of East Tennessee to explore the possibility
of having a child through the use of in vitro fertilization (hereinafter
"IVF").8 In the fall of 1985 the couple underwent IVF.6 After six un-
successful attempts to produce a child using the procedure the couple
withdrew from the program and attempted to adopt a child.7 The adop-
tion attempt also proved unsuccessful. 8
In the fall of 1988, having learned of the new cryopreservation
technique9 now utilized by Dr. King, the Davises returned to the clinic
1. Davis v. Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at 4 (No. E-14496 Tenn. Cir. Sept. 21, 1989).
2. Id.
3. An ectopic pregnancy is one which occurs somewhere other than the uterine cavity.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 442 (24th ed. 1982) [hereinafter STEDMAN'S].
4. 1989 WL 140495, at 4.
5. In vitro fertilization is a process whereby the egg is surgically removed from a woman,
placed together with sperm in vitro, and incubated to allow for fertilization. If fertilization occurs
the resulting conceptus is allowed to mature to an acceptable level (usually two to three days) and
then transferred to the uterine cavity of the woman where it hopefully will implant, resulting in a
pregnancy. Vetri, Reproductive Technologies and United States Law, 37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
505 (1988). See also Brahams, The Legal and Social Problems of In Vitro Fertilisation: Why
Parliament Must Legislate, 51 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 236 (1983).
6. 1989 WL 140495, at 5.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Cryopreservation is a means of freezing embryos not immediately used. In the IVF pro-
cedure the ovaries are stimulated to produce multiple eggs (up to six or eight; "superovulation").
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and re-entered the IVF program."0 In December 1988 nine ova were
removed from Mrs. Davis and inseminated with Mr. Davis' sperm. All
nine ova were fertilized. After the resulting zygotes' matured to the
appropriate level12 two were transferred to Mrs. Davis and the remain-
ing seven were placed in cryogenic storage.' 3 The two transferred em-
bryos failed to produce a pregnancy. 4
The Davises tentatively planned to transfer at least one of the cry-
opreserved embryos to Mrs. Davis' uterus in March or April of 1989.'"
However, before any disposition was made of the embryos, Mr. Davis
filed for divorce. In February 1989 he filed suit in the Circuit Court of
Tennessee, Blount County, seeking an order preventing Mrs. Davis
from transferring the remaining embryos.' 6
The circuit court concluded that: (1) human embryos are not
property but human beings in vitro;'7 (2) human life begins at concep-
tion;' 8 (3) the common law doctrine of parens patriae9 controls chil-
Robertson, Decisional Authority Over Embryos and Control of IVF Technology, 28 JURIMETRICS
J. 285 (1988). However, only a limited number of fertilized eggs can be transferred to the uterus
at one time. The replacement of large numbers of embryos poses serious risks to both the mother
and the offspring. Trounson, Preservation of human eggs and embryos, 46 FERTILITY & STERIL-
ITY 1 (1986). The freezing of excess embryos is attractive in connection with IVF for several
reasons. First, pharmacologically induced superovulation increases the efficacy of the IVF proce-
dure. Often, more fertilized eggs are produced than can be safely transferred to the uterus in a
single attempt. Surplus embryos, if frozen, can be used in later attempts if the first transfer fails
to cause a pregnancy. Freezing can obviate the cost and discomfort of repeated laparoscopy (the
surgical process by which the eggs are removed). Second, freezing may further increase the effi-
cacy of IVF, which results in less than one birth per four embryo transfer attempts. Pharmaco-
logic induction of superovulation may, through hormonal effects on the uterus, reduce implanta-
tion efficacy. If so, frozen storage of the embryos could allow for embryo transfer to the uterus in
a later, undisturbed cycle. Third, freezing gives the couple greater latitude in choosing the time of
pregnancy. Freezing expands treatment options as well. Grobstein, Flower & Mendeloff, Frozen
Embryos: Policy Issues, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1584, at 1584-85 (1985).
10. 1989 WL 140495, at 5.
11. A zygote is "[tihe diploid cell resulting from union of a sperm and an ovum."
STEDMAN'S, supra note 3, at 1590.
12. It is necessary to allow the fertilized egg to divide several times prior to its transfer to a
uterus. Robertson, Embryo Research, 24 UW. ONTARIO L. REV. 15 (1986). For a description of
the stages of embryonic and fetal development, see Grobstein, The Early Development of Human
Embryos, 10 J. MED. & PHIL. 213 (1985).
13. 1989 WL 140495, at 6.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 7.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2.
18. Id.
19. Parens patriae refers to the role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under
legal disability. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979) [hereinafter BLACK'S].
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dren in vitro;2" (4) it was in the best interests of the child (or children)
that they be available for implantation;2" and (5) it was in the child's
(or children's) best interest that Mrs. Davis be permitted to bring them
to term through implantation.22
The court ruled that temporary custody of the embryos be vested
in Mrs. Davis for the purpose of implantation. The court reserved
judgment on the issues of support, visitation, and final custody until one
or more of the embryos became the product of live birth. Davis v. Da-
vis, 1989 WL 140495 (No. E-14496 Tenn. Cir. Ct. 1989).
Medical authority has traditionally recognized the existence of the
unborn child from the moment of conception.2" Legal authorities have
reached differing conclusions on the matter, depending upon the con-
text in which the question arises - tort law, criminal law or the consti-
tutional right of privacy. Although these diverse contexts are not di-
rectly apposite to the issue in Davis, legal issues regarding the
"personhood" of the fetus in these areas have implications for Davis
and vice versa.
In 1884 Judge (later Supreme Court Justice) Oliver Wendell
Holmes reasoned that an "unborn child [is] a part of the mother" and,
therefore, cannot recover for the wrongful conduct of another.2
Holmes' reasoning provided the basis of most of the decisions in tort
law for the next sixty years.2" The 1946 case of Bonbrest v. Kotz26
marked the turning point in recognizing the fetus as a separate entity
deserving of compensation for injuries inflicted upon it in utero. The
court in Bonbrest recognized that a viable fetus is not "part" of its
mother, noting that "[m]odern medicine is replete with cases of living
children being taken from dead mothers. 27
Presently, every American jurisdiction allows a child injured in
utero to maintain an action for the injury if the child is born alive. 28
However, there is disagreement as to the stage of fetal development at
20. 1989 WL 140495, at 2.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS. R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 55, at 367 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
24. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884).
25. See Note, Tort Recovery for the Unborn Child, 15 J. FAM. L. 276 (1976-77).
26. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
27. Id. at 140.
28. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 23, § 55, at 368.
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which liability attaches. 9 Most jurisdictions require that the fetus be
viable3" at the time of injury before liability is imposed.3 1 In contrast,
several courts have allowed recovery for injury to a nonviable fetus.32 A
very few courts have gone so far as to allow recovery for injury to the
fetus resulting from tortious contact with the mother prior to
conception.3 3
Decisions in the criminal law area concerning harm to the fetus
usually turn on statutory interpretation. Most homicide statutes define
crimes with reference to causing the death of another "person." 34 Thus,
the determinative issue in criminal cases is the meaning of the word
"person" as used in the statute; that is, is the unborn fetus a "person"
within the meaning of the statute? In the absence of legislative direc-
tion to the contrary, most American courts have held that a fetus is not
a person unless it is born alive and dies later from injuries inflicted in
utero.
3 5
Courts typically engage in the same kind of statutory analysis in
wrongful death actions.3" However, a majority of courts reach a differ-
ent conclusion regarding the "personhood" of a fetus in the wrongful
death area, allowing a claim for wrongful death even if the fetus is
29. Id.
30. Viability connotes the stage of development at which a fetus is capable of living outside
the womb. This is usually defined as a fetus weighing 500g and having reached 20 gestational
weeks. STEDMAN'S, supra note 3, at 1556.
31. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 23, § 55, at 368.
32. See Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 Loy. L. REV. 357, 377-86 (1986).
33. E.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977) (valid
claim for relief when child was born jaundiced and suffering from hyperbilirubinemia because of
an incompatible blood transfusion given to the mother prior to conception). But see Albala v. City
of New York, 54 N.Y.2d 269, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108, 429 N.E.2d 786 (1981) (child has no cause of
action for injuries resulting from an operation on the mother prior to conception).
34. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101 (1987) ("A person commits capital murder if... he
...causes the death of any person .... " (emphasis added)); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104
(1987) ("A person commits manslaughter if ... he causes the death of another person.
(emphasis added)).
35. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.1, at 608-09 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
LAFAVE & SCOTT]; see also Note, A Fetus is not a "'Person" as the Term is Used in the Man-
slaughter Statute, 10 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 403, 407-10 (1987-88) (authored by J. Shan-
non). But see People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P.2d 92 (1947) (rejecting the "born
alive" rule the court held that a fetus killed during birth was a human being under the homicide
statute). Subsequently, the California Supreme Court refused to extend the homicide statutes to
cover the killing of a viable fetus not in the process of birth. Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d
619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970) (death of a thirty-four to thirty-six week old fetus
delivered stillborn by caesarean section not actionable under the state homicide statutes).
36. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-102 (1987) provides that a wrongful death action lies
"[wihenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act ...." (emphasis added).
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stillborn." Most of these courts limit wrongful death actions to in-
stances where the fetus could have maintained an action for its injuries
had it survived.38 However, several jurisdictions allow an action for le-
thal injuries inflicted upon a nonviable fetus.3 9
More directly relevant to the issue in Davis are decisions of the
United States Supreme Court in the abortion area. In Roe v. Wade'0
the United States Supreme Court, confronted with a state law proscrib-
ing abortion, stated in dictum that "the word 'person,' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn."' 1 The Court
specifically declined, however, to state at what point in fetal develop-
ment life begins:
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When
those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this
point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to
speculate as to the answer. 2
The Court added that the state does have an "important and legit-
imate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life,"' 3 but that
the state may not, by adopting one theory of life, "override the rights
of the pregnant woman that are at stake.""
In subsequent decisions the Court, though still not addressing the
question of when life begins, reaffirmed the state's interest in making
"a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion."' 5 In Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services," the Court addressed the constitutional-
ity of a state statute which, in its preamble, provided that "[t]he life of
each human being begins at conception,' ', 7 and that "[u]nborn children
37. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 23, § 55, at 370.
38. Andrews, supra note 32, at 388.
39. Id.
40. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
41. Id. at 158.
42. Id. at 159.
43. Id. at 162.
44. Id.
45. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (state law under which Medicaid recipents
were eligible for payments for medical services incident to childbirth but not for medical services
incident to nontherapeutic abortions held constitutional). See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297 (1980) (congressional prohibition on the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost of abor-
tions held constitutional).
46. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
47. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205.1(1) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
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have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being." 4 The pream-
ble further provided that:
[T]he laws of this state shall be interpreted and construed to acknowl-
edge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development, all
the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citi-
zens, and residents of this state, subject only to the Constitution of the
United States, and decisional interpretations thereof by the United
States Supreme Court and specific provisions to the contrary in the
statutes and constitution of this state.' 9
The Court stated that its previous decisions concerning abortion
meant "only that a State could not 'justify' an abortion regulation oth-
erwise invalid under Roe v. Wade on the ground that it embodied the
State's view about when life begins." 50 Noting that the preamble did
not by its terms regulate abortion and re-emphasizing that Roe v.
Wade "implies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a
value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion,"'" the Court declined
to pass on the constitutionality of the act's preamble.5" Presumably
then, the Missouri statute is constitutionally valid to the extent that it
does not interfere with a woman's right to have an abortion.
Because of the relative novelty of IVF,53 in particular IVF utiliz-
ing cryopreservation," there is a scarcity of law dealing with the sub-
ject. There is no case law directly on point.
The most publicized instance dealing with the disposition of frozen
embryos is that involving Mario and Elsa Rios.55 In 1981 the Rioses, a
California couple, attempted a pregnancy through the use of IVF at
the Queen Victoria Medical Center of Melbourne, Australia. 5 Doctors
48. Id. § 1.205.1(2).
49. Id. § 1.205.2 (emphasis added).
50. 109 S. Ct. at 3050.
51. Id. (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
52. id.
53. The first successful birth resulting from the use of IVF occurred in England in 1978.
Between 1978 and 1981, two clinics in Australia were successful in achieving births using IVF. It
was not until December 1981 that a child, conceived in vitro, was born in the United States.
Dickey, The Medical Status of the Embryo, 32 Loy. L. REV. 317, 323-24 (1986). Since 1978, an
estimated 15,000 babies have been born through IVF, some 5,500 in the United States. Smothers,
Embryos in a Divorce Case: Joint Property or Offspring?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1989, at 1, col. 6.
54. The first successful attempt at creating a pregnancy using a cryopreserved embryo in
the United States was in late 1982. Trounson, supra note 9, at 2.
55. For a synopsis of the case see S. GREEN, J. LONG & R. MURAWSKI, MARRIAGE AND
FAMILY LAW AGREEMENTS 69 (Supp. 1989) [hereinafter GREEN & LONG].
56. Note, Genesis Retold: Legal Issues Raised By The Cryopreservation of Preimplanta-
[Vol. 13:95
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at the clinic removed three eggs from Mrs. Rios and fertilized them
with the sperm of an anonymous donor.5 7 One of the embryos was im-
planted and the remaining two were frozen for future use.58 The im-
planted embryo failed to produce a pregnancy. Before either of the
remaining embryos could be implanted, the couple was killed in an air-
plane crash. 9
The debate over the disposition of the two frozen embryos resulted
in a report from the Committee to Consider the Social, Ethical and
Legal Issues Arising from In Vitro Fertilization. 60 The Committee
made several recommendations concerning cryopreserved embryos,
most of which the Parliament of the State of Victoria accepted and
passed into legislation.6' However, the Parliament rejected the Com-
mittee's recommendation that frozen embryos be removed from storage
and allowed to expire if they could not be implanted as originally
planned and no other provision had been made for them. 2 Instead, the
Parliament passed legislation stating:
Where, after an embryo has been derived from an ovum pro-
duced by a woman and fertilized outside her body for the purpose of a
relevant procedure to be carried out in relation to her or another wo-
man, the embryo cannot be implanted in the body of that woman...
the embryo shall be made available, in accordance with the consent of
the persons who produced the gametes from which the embryo was
derived, for use in a relevant procedure carried out in relation to an-
other woman; or where those consents cannot be obtained because the
persons are dead or cannot be found, the Minister shall direct the
designated officer of the approved hospital where the embryo is stored
to ensure that the embryo is made available for use in a relevant pro-
cedure carried out in relation to another woman."
Pursuant to this legislative enactment, the two embryos were im-
tion Human Embryos, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1021, 1030 (1985).
57. Id. at 1030.
58. Id.
59. GREEN & LONG, supra note 55, at 69.
60. See The Committee to Consider the Social, Ethical and Legal Issues Arising From In
Vitro Fertilization: Report on the Disposition of Embryos Produced by In Vitro Fertilization 24-
33 (1984), [hereinafter WALLER COMMITTEE REPORT] (as reprinted in Note, supra note 56, at
1030 n.56).
61. Note, supra note 56, at 1032.
62. Id.
63. A Bill to Amend the Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act of 1984, dated 25 October
1984, 1-543-1000/25.10.1984-80813/84 (Revision No. 5)(921), at 13-14 (clause 14) (as reprinted
in Note, supra note 57, at 1032 n.61).
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planted in a patient at the Queen Victoria Medical Center on an anon-
ymous basis.6 However, because the process of embryo cryopreserva-
tion was in its early stages at the time the Rios embryos were frozen, it
is doubtful that the embryos survived thawing and implantation. 6
Only two American courts have directly addressed the legal status
of IVF embryos. In Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital"6 the court
awarded damages to a married couple for the intentional destruction of
their gametes67 that had been placed together in vitro. 8 Mr. and Mrs.
Del Zio had undergone the the IVF procedure at Presbyterian Hospi-
tal, under the direction of a hospital physician. After the sperm and
ova had been placed together in an incubator, the physician's supervi-
sor69 learned of the procedure and ordered the potential conceptus 7 0
destroyed.7 1 This was done without the knowledge of either the Del
Zios or their treating physician.72
The Del Zios sought damages for the destruction of the potential
conceptus, asserting two theories of recovery: (1) intentional infliction
of emotional distress;73 and (2) tortious conversion of property .7  The
jury awarded damages in the amount of $50,000 on the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress claim 75 but denied recovery on the conver-
sion claim. 76 Although the conversion claim failed in Del Zio, the fact
that the trial court allowed the claim to go to the jury implies that the
court considered the potential conceptus 77 to be property, since only
property can be converted. 8
64. GREEN & LONG, supra note 56, at 69.
65. Note, supra note 56, at 1033.
66. No. 74 Civ. 3588. (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1978).
67. A gamete is any germ cell (the ovum or spermatozoon). STEDMAN'S, supra note 3, at
571.
68. The sperm and ovum had been placed together in vitro but fertilization had not been
confirmed. Powledge, A Report from the Del Zio Trial, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 14 (Oct. 1978).
69. IVF was unauthorized at the hospital and the Del Zios' physician had failed to obtain
permission to carry out the procedure. Comment, New Reproductive Technologies: The Legal
Problem and a Solution, 49 TENN. L. REV. 303, 317-18 (1982).
70. See supra note 68.
71. Palm, Legal Implications of Artificial Conception: Making Babies Makes Law, 1982
MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 404, 421.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 422.
75. Id. at 421.
76. Id. at 422.
77. See supra note 68.
78. "Conversion: An unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over
goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the exclu-
[Vol. 13:95
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In York v. Jones79 the court dealt with custody of a frozen embryo
solely in terms of property. Dr. and Mrs. York entered the IVF pro-
gram at the Jones Institute in Norfolk, Virginia in 1986. Six eggs were
removed from Mrs. York and fertilized with Dr. York's sperm. Five of
the embryos were transferred to Mrs. York's uterus, while the remain-
ing embryo was placed in cryogenic storage. Prior to the freezing of
the embryo the Yorks signed a Cryopreservation Agreement with the
hospital which provided in pertinent part:
We may withdraw our consent and discontinue participation at any
time without prejudice and we understand our pre-zygotes will be
stored only as long as we are active IVF patients at the [Jones Insti-
tute] or until the end of our normal reproductive years. We have the
principle responsibility to decide the disposition of our pre-zygotes.
Our frozen pre-zygotes will not be released from storage for the pur-
pose of intrauterine transfer without the written consents of us both.
In the event of divorce, we understand legal ownership of any stored
pre-zygotes must be determined in a property settlement and will be
released as directed by order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
Should we for any reason no longer wish to attempt to initiate a preg-
nancy, we understand we may choose one of three fates for our pre-
zygotes that remain in frozen storage. Our pre-zygotes may be: 1)
donated to another infertile couple (who will remain unknown to us)
2) donated for approved research investigation 3) thawed but not al-
lowed to undergo further development."0
None of the five transferred embryos produced a pregnancy. After
moving to Los Angeles, the Yorks sought to transfer the remaining em-
bryo to an IVF clinic in California. Their physician, acting on behalf
of the Jones Institute, refused to allow the transfer.81
The Yorks brought an action seeking the release and transfer of
the embryo from the Institute. The complaint was in four counts: (1)
breach of contract; (2) quasi-contract; (3) detinue; 2and (4) 42 U.S.C.
sion of the owner's rights. Any unauthorized act which deprives an owner of his property perma-
nently or for an indefinite time." BLACK'S, supra note 19, at 300 (emphasis added). This was one
of the arguments set forth by the defendant in the principal case. Brief for Defendant and
Counter-Plaintiff at 3, Davis v. Davis, 1989 WL 140495 (No. E-14496 Tenn. Cir. Ct. 1989) (filed
July 17, 1989).
79. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
80. Id. at 424.
81. id.
82. Detinue is a form of action demanding the return (in specie), along with damages for
retention, of chattels from one who acquired possession in a lawful manner but retains it without
right. BLACK'S, supra note 19, at 405.
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§ 1983.8 The court, in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the
first two counts, spoke strictly in property terms. The court ruled that
the Cryopreservation Agreement created a bailment which implied an
obligation to return the property (the conceptus) to the plaintiffs.84
Again using a property analysis, the court found that the plaintiffs
stated a cause of action in detinue.85 The court found that the Institute
was not a state actor and, consequently, dismissed the section 1983
count.86
Various advisory committees have reached differing conclusions on
the status of the embryo in vitro. In the United States, an Ethics Advi-
sory Board (EAB) was formed in the mid-1970s under the direction of
the Department of Health Education and Welfare. 7 The EAB issued
a report88 concluding that "the human embryo is entitled to profound
respect; but this respect does not necessarily encompass the full legal
and moral rights attributed to persons."8 " However, the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Bi-
omedical and Behavioral Research replaced the EAB and has taken no
action on the basis of the report.
In Australia, the Waller Committee Report"0 concluded that the
couple whose embryo was stored should not be regarded as having
83. 717 F. Supp. 421, 423.
84. The court stated that:
While the parties in this case expressed no intent to create a bailment, under Virginia
law, no formal contract or actual meeting of the minds is necessary. [citation omitted].
Rather, all that is needed is the element of lawful possession however created, and duty
to account for the thing as the property of another that created the bailment. [citation
omitted]. The essential nature of a bailment relationship imposes on the bailee, when
the purpose of the bailment has terminated, an absolute obligation to return the subject
matter of the bailment to the bailor. [citation omitted].
Id. at 425 (emphasis added) (citing Crandall v. Wird, 206 Va. 321, 143 S.E.2d 923, 927 (1965)).
85. The court stated that:
The requisite elements of a detinue action in Virginia are as follows: (1) plaintiff must
have a property interest in the thing sought to be recovered; (2) the right to immediate
possession; (3) the property is capable of identification; (4) the property must be of
some value; and (5) defendant must have had possession at some time prior to the
institution of the act.
Id. at 427 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 429.
87. Now the Department of Health and Human Services.
88. ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD REPORT AND CONCLUSIONS: HEW SUPPORT OF. RESEARCH
INVOLVING HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033
(June 18, 1979).
89. Id. at 35,056.
90. WALLER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 60.
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property rights to the embryo and therefore should not be allowed to
sell or casually dispose of it.91 However, as previously noted, the Re-
port recommended destruction of the embryo if: (1) the planned dispo-
sition could not be made of it; and (2) no other provisions were made
for it.92 The Victorian Parliament rejected this recommendation.
The Warnock Commission in Great Britian. issued a report 93 which
stated:
[T]he human embryo ...is not under the present law of the UK
accorded the same status as a living child or an adult, nor do we nec-
essarily wish it to be accorded the same status. Nevertheless we were
agreed that the embryo of the human species ought to have a special
status.9
The Commission also recommended that legislation be enacted "to en-
sure there is no right of ownership in a human embryo." 8 The report
further recommended that, upon the death of the gamete donors, the
fate of the embryo(s) be determined by the storage facility.96
The American Fertility Society has issued an Ethical Statement
on In Vitro Fertilization7 which stated:
It is understood that any couple entering into a program of in vitro
fertilization will have discussed and signed a proper consent form cov-
ering the various steps in the procedure. It is understood that the
gametes and concepti are the property of the donors. The donors
therefore have the right to decide at their sole discretion the disposi-
tion of these items, provided such disposition is within medical and
ethical guidelines as outlined herein. 98
Thus, various advisory boards have reached somewhat discordant
conclusions regarding the status of the in vitro embryo. However, it
appears that all of the committees agree that the IVF embryo, though
91. WALLER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 60, at 27-28, reprinted in Note, supra note
56, at 1030 n.56.
92. Id.
93. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOL-
OGY, (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1984) [hereinafter WARNOCK REPORT].
94. Id. at 63, reprinted in Robertson, Embryo Research, 24 U.W. ONTARIO L. REV. 15, 24
(1986).
95. WARNOCK REPORT, supra note 93, quoted in S. ELIAS & G. ANNAs, REPRODUCTIVE
GENETICS AND THE LAW 130 (1987).
96. S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, supra note 95, at 131.
97. American Fertility Society, Ethical Statement on In Vitro Fertilization, 41 FERTILITY
AND STERILITY 12 (1984).
98. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
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deserving of protection, should not be treated as a human being.
To date only one state, Louisiana, has enacted legislation dealing
with the legal status of the IVF embryo.99 The Louisiana legislation
provides that the "in vitro fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical
person until such time as the in vitro fertilized ovum is implanted in
the womb; or at any other time when rights attach to an unborn child
in accordance with the law." ' The act further provides that: (1) the in
vitro embryo "is a biological human being which is not the property of
the physician . . . the facility which employs him or the donors of the
sperm and ovum"; 101 (2) the in vitro embryo "shall not be intentionally
destroyed by any natural or other juridical person";102 and (3) that
"[iin disputes arising between any parties regarding the in vitro fertil-
ized ovum, the judicial standard for resolving such disputes is to be the
best interest of the in vitro fertilized ovum."103 No court, as of yet, has
addressed the constitutionality of the statute.
The court in Davis began its analysis by stating that the intent of
Mr. and Mrs. Davis was "to produce a human being to be known as
their child."' 4 This being their intent, the court found it necessary to
determine whether that intent was accomplished. In the court's view
this required a determination of when human life begins. The court
noted that all of the expert witnesses' 05 at the trial agreed that the
seven cryopreserved embryos were human.'06 However, the experts dis-
agreed as to whether the embryos were "in being." Three of the wit-
nesses expressed the opinion that the embryos represented only the "po-
tential for life," while one believed the embryos were actually "in
being." 0 7
99. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121 to 133 (West Supp. 1990).
100. Id. § 9:123.
101. Id. § 9:126.
102. Id. § 9:129.
103. Id. § 9:131.
104. 1989 WL 140495, at 8.
105. The expert witnesses at the trial were: (1) Dr. Irving Ray King, the director of the
Fertility Center of East Tennessee; (2) Dr. Charles A. Shivers, the head of the Department of
Zoology at the University of Tennessee (Dr. Shivers also works in the laboratory at the Fertility
Center of East Tennessee); (3) Dr. Jerome Lejeune, a Professor of Fundamental Genetics and a
pediatrician (Dr. Lejeune discovered the genetic cause of Down's Syndrome); and (4) Professor
John A. Robertson, Professor of Law at the University of Texas and a member of the American
Fertility Society's Ethics Committee. Professor Robertson has written extensively on the subject of
IVF and cryopreservation. Id. at 42-64.
106. Id. at 9.
107. Id.
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Drs. King and Shivers testified that during the first fourteen days
of its existence the "pre-embryo"' 8 is a mass of undifferentiated
cells."0 9 Dr. Shivers testified that at the time of fertilization genetic
controls are "locked in forever,"' " 0 but that, to his knowledge, there
was no way to distinguish the cells prior to the appearance of the prim-
itive streak."' Professor Robertson expressed much the same opinion,
noting that "it is not clear" that a human pre-embryo is a unique indi-
vidual."' Robertson also stated that the gamete donors have not pro-
created simply because fertilization has occurred." 3 Dr. Lejeune was
alone in testifying that each human being is unique upon conception
and that this fact is scientifically demonstrable through the use of
DNA' 1  profiling." 5
108. A major point of contention at the trial was the denomination of the embryo in its
earliest stages. The American Fertility Society uses the term "pre-embryo" to denote the concep-
tus prior to cell differentiation which occurs some fourteen days after fertilization. Drs. King and
Shivers, as well as Professor Robertson, were in agreement that "pre-embryo" was the proper
denomination for the conceptus until formation of the primitive streak. Dr. Lejeune testified that
there was no such word and that an embryo was the earliest form of life. The court in accepting
Dr. Lejeune's view noted that: (1) no reference to the word was made in any encyclopedia or
dictionary it consulted; (2) Dr. King, in his handwritten notes concerning Mrs. Davis, repeatedly
made reference to the "embryos," making no reference to the word "pre-embryo"; and (3) Profes-
sor Robertson, in a paper written specifically for the Davis case (see infra note 113), made con-
stant reference to the "embryos." 1989 WL 140495, at 10-16.
109. Id. at 10.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. See also Robertson, Resolving Disputes Over Frozen Embryos, HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 7 (Nov./Dec. 1989). This article was written especially for the Davis case and is mentioned
in the opinion at page 15.
114. "Deoxyribonucleic acid: an essential component of all living matter and a basic mate-
rial in the chromosones of the cell nucleus: it contains the genetic code and transmits the heredi-
tary pattern." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY SECOND CONCISE EDITION 202 (1982).
115. 1989 WL 14049, at 63. "DNA fingerprinting is based on the unique character of each
individual's genetic makeup (contained in their DNA). DNA fingerprints are 'pictures' of certain
regions of DNA that vary from person to person. The pattern of the print is unique, and a person
can be identified by comparing his DNA fingerprint with an unknown." Note, Evidence of DNA
Fingerprinting Admitted for Identification Purposes in a Rape Trial, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L.J. 543, 543 n.6 (1990) (authored by C. Clayborn).
Dr. Lejeune compared the DNA code to the bar code on items at a grocery store and stated
that a new device invented by Dr. Alec Jeffreys in England enabled scientists to read the DNA
code of a cell in much the same way a superemarket register reads the bar code of a grocery item.
Dr. Lejeune stated that by using this method:
We detect every individual is different from the next one by its own bar code. And that
is no longer a demonstration by statistical reasoning. So many investigations have been
made that we know now that looking at the bar code . . . the probability that you will
find it identical in another person is less than one in a billion. So it's not any longer a
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The court noted that the American Fertility Society (AFS) recog-
nizes several respected views regarding the legal and moral status of
the pre-embryo" 6 and that the Ethics Committee of the Society chose
to adopt the view that:
[T]he preembryo deserves respect greater than accorded to human tis-
sue but not the respect accorded to actual persons. The preembryo is
due greater respect than any other human tissue because of its poten-
tial to become a person and because of its symbolic meaning for many
people. Yet, it should not be treated as a person, because it has not
yet developed the features of personhood, is not yet established as de-
velopmentally individual, and may never realize its biologic
potential.1 17
The Davis court concluded that the AFS view of the conceptus merely
constituted a professional guideline and did not serve as authority for
the court to use in determining the status of the embryos."1 8 However,
the court noted that the AFS guidelines must be considered for their
probative value. 1
Turning to the question of cell differentiation in the embryo, the
court noted the equivocality of Dr. Shivers" 2 and Professor Robert-
son's testimony,' and accepted the "unrebutted" testimony of Dr.
Lejeune that the cells of an embryo are indeed differentiated and
unique.12 2 The court then summafily dismissed the argument that the
embryo may never reach its biologic potential. The court noted that
the argument was statistically and speculatively true but reasoned that
a newborn baby may never reach its biologic potential and "no one
theory that each one of us is unique. It's now a demonstration as simple as a bar code
in a supermarket.
Testimony of Jerome Lejeune, M.D., Davis v. Davis (No. E-14496 Tenn. Cir. Ct. 1989), reprinted
in Center for Law and Religious Freedom, Custody Dispute Over Seven Human Embryos 45 (n.p.
n.d.) (Dr. Lejeune testified on Aug. 10, 1989).
116. 1989 WL 140495, at 13.
117. Id. (quoting AFS Publication, Vol. 46, No. 3, at 29S).
118. Id. at 14.
119. Id.
120. Dr. Shivers testified that "as far as we know . . . there is no way to distinguish the
cells [at the zygote stage] ... ." Id. at 10.
121. Professor Robertson testified that it is "not clear" that a human pre-embryo is a
unique individual. Id.
122. Id. at 18. The court cited Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988), review denied, 542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1989), in support of the admissibility into evidence of
DNA profiling. In Andrews, DNA profiling was allowed as evidence in a rape trial.
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disputes the fact that a newborn baby is a human being."' 123
Similarly, the court dismissed the argument that the embryo at
this stage of development is fungible property. The court found this
argument not "well founded in logic and good reason," 12 citing Ten-
nessee Congressman Albert Gore's response to a similar theory ad-
vanced before the House Subcommittee on Investigations and Over-
sight of the Committee on Science and Technology that: "I disagree
that there's just a sliding scale of continmum [sic] with property at one
point along the spectrum and human beings at another. I think there's
a sharp distinction between something that is property and something
that is not property.9 12
5
The court concluded that the embryos are human beings, not prop-
erty, and that life begins at conception. Thus, the court reasoned Mr.
and Mrs. Davis had "accomplished their original intent to produce a
human being to be known as their child."' 6
The court then turned its attention to what disposition was to be
made of the "children." The court recognized that, while Tennessee's
Wrongful Death 27 and Criminal Abortion 28 Statutes accorded no le-
gal status to the embryo in the early stages of its development, the
Tennessee Legislature had yet to address the status of the embryo in
the IVF context. 129 The court further recognized that the United States
Supreme Court in Webster'3" had "left the door open for a state to
establish its compelling interest in even potential life by legislation de-
claring its public policy."''
Noting the lack of legislative guidance in the area, the court cited
Smith v. Gore, 132 a wrongful pregnancy case, in which the Tennessee
Supreme Court observed that the state places great value on human
life and that no public policy prevents the continuing development of
the common law. Having determined that the frozen embryos were
"human beings," the court extended the doctrine of parens patriae'3
123. 1989 WL 140495, at 19.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 20-21.
126. Id. at 21.
127. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106(b) (1980).
128. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-201(c) (1989).
129. 1989 WL 140495, at 21-22.
130. 109 S. Ct. 3040.
131. 1989 WL 140495, at 22.
132. 728 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1987).
133. See supra note 19.
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to them. The court reasoned that parens patriae controls children in
vitro just as it does "children of a marriage at live birth in domestic
relations cases."''3
The doctrine of parens patriae is concerned with the child's inter-
ests, not with the interests of those who claim an interest in the
child.' 35 Noting that to allow the embryos to remain frozen for more
than two years would be tantamount to their destruction, and further
noting that Mr. Davis was strongly opposed to the anonymous donation
of the embryos, the court concluded it was in the best interests of the
children in vitro that they be made available for implantation in Mrs.
Davis.136
The significance of the Davis decision is potentially tremendous.
With infertility among married couples in the United States estimated
to be around fifteen percent, 3 7 it is certain that IVF will become more
prevalent. It is equally certain that, as a result of the growth of IVF,
disputes.such as the Davises' will become more frequent.' 38
Davis may hold particular significance for Arkansas. With the
passage of Amendment 68 to the Arkansas Constitution in 1988, the
people of Arkansas declared that "[tihe policy of Arkansas is to protect
the life of every unborn child from conception until birth, to the extent
permitted by the Federal Constitution." 39 If Davis is upheld as consti-
tutional, the Arkansas courts may feel obliged to reach the same result
if faced with a similar situation.
The Davis court's determination that in vitro embryos are "human
beings" clearly cuts against the great weight of authority."" However,
it should be borne in mind that cases dealing with the conceptus have
heretofore done so in vastly different contexts.
The constitutionality of the Davis decision remains to be decided.
If Roe and its progeny are viewed as protecting the right of a woman to
be free from unwanted gestational and child rearing burdens, the deci-
134. 1989 WL 140495, at 23-24.
135. Id. at 24.
136. Id. at 25.
137. Vetri, supra note 5, at 505.
138. Lori Andrews, a legal expert on reproductive technologies (see supra, note 32), stated
in April, 1989: "I just left a conference on cryopreservation where two doctors from other states
stood up to say that they had cases very similar to the Tennessee case where there is a divorce."
Smothers, supra note 53, at 8, col. 5.
139. ARK. CONST. amend. 68, § 2.
140. E.g., 410 U.S. 113. "In short, the unborn have never been recognized in the law as
persons in the whole sense." Id. at 162.
[Vol. 13:95
CUSTODY OF EMBRYO
sion is probably on firm constitutional footing. No such right is im-
pinged upon by protecting the embryo in vitro from destruction against
the wishes of one of the gamete donors. However, if Roe is viewed as
protecting the right not to procreate,14 the constitutionality of the Da-
vis decision is questionable. The former interpretation of Roe is partic-
ularly persuasive in view of the fact that the Supreme Court has held
that a state may not constitutionally require a married woman to ob-
tain spousal consent prior to an abortion.142 Presumably, if the interest
protected by Roe is the right of procreative choice, the husband would
have rights similar to the wife's regarding the decision.1 43
Assuming the constitutionality of the Davis decision, the court's
conclusion nevertheless raises the possibility of seemingly anomalous
results in the area of prenatal life. By granting the embryo the status
of a "human being," the court accords the embryo the full protection of
the law. The right of a mother who carries a fetus in utero to have an
abortion is, at least through the first trimester, absolute. Therefore,
under the reasoning of Davis, an in vitro embryo, with less potential for
life than a three-month-old fetus, is afforded far greater protection
under the law.
However, the differing results may be justified when the interests
involved in each case are considered. The fetus in utero imposes sub-
stantial burdens on the mother. The rights, if any, of the fetus and the
"State's important and legitimate interest in potential life"" must
therefore be balanced against the pregnant woman's interest in avoid-
ing gestational burdens. In this context, the Supreme Court has ruled
that a pregnant woman's interest will prevail. 4 5
The rights at issue in the IVF context are vastly different. The
only interest that the gamete donor opposing implantation could claim
141. Contra Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure
of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939 (1986). "If no gestational or rearing obliga-
tions are imposed, the Court may find that there is no fundamental right to prevent unkown lineal
descendants." Id. at 980.
142. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
143. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-10 (2d ed. 1988).
Recognition of a true right to decide whether one's body shall be the source of another
life would also be problematic on equal protection grounds, since such a right cannot be
recognized in a man without empowering him to compel the abortion of any fetus con-
ceived with his sperm-something forbidden under the Court's current doctrine.
Id. at 1359. For a discussion of Roe as it applies to IVF embryos, see Note, Frozen Embryos:
The Constitution on Ice, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 267, at 270-81 (1985).
144. 410 U.S. at 163.
145. 410 U.S. 113.
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is the interest in avoiding a genetic link. When this interest is weighed
against the state's interest in protecting "potential life," concluding
that the scales should tip in favor of the latter is quite reasonable.14 As
one commentator stated:
But what of the day when even the youngest fetus can safely be
removed to another woman's womb or to some artificial incubator by
a procedure no more threatening to the pregnant woman's well-being
than that used to accomplish an abortion? In that instance, the wo-
man's right to terminate her pregnancy and the fetus' right to life
may be vindicated simultaneously. But the woman would no longer
have complete control over her reproductive destiny, since her body
would be the source of a new life she may not have wished to come
into being. In order to vindicate that right, may a pregnant woman
insist not only that the unwanted fetus be removed from her body, but
also that it be killed? Apart from the problematic character of any
claim in behalf of such a right, its recognition and enforcement would
be indistinguishable from licensing infanticide." 7
The rationale of the Davis court in reaching this result is nonethe-
less troubling. As previously noted, the conclusion that the human em-
bryo is a "child" is opposed by the weight of legal authority. 1" 8 The
result in Davis could easily have been reached by making a determina-
tion that the embryos represented "potential life" and, as such, de-
served state protection." 9
The decision in Davis raises additional questions in domestic rela-
tions law. For instance, does the unwilling gamete donor have support
obligations toward any embryos successfully brought to term? Presum-
ably, in the absence of contrary legislation, the unwilling donor would
146. See Robertson, supra note 141. "[The Supreme Court] might also prevent discard
when the two gamete providers disagree about disposition. As long as the unwilling partner is not
forced into gestational or rearing burdens, the partner wishing to procreate might be given priority
over the partner wishing to avoid biological offspring." Id. at 980-81.
147. L. TRIBE, supra note 143, at 1359.
148. See supra notes 30-52.
149. E.g., Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960), wherein the court con-
cluded that it was unnecessary to denote the conceptus a "person" to allow recovery for prenatal
torts. Noting that the process which ultimately results in a person begins at conception, the court
stated that "(i]f in the meanwhile those processes can be disrupted resulting in harm to the child
when born, it is immaterial whether before birth the child is considered a person in being." 31
N.J. at 363, 157 A.2d at 503. See also Annas, The Ethics of Embryo Research: Not as Easy as
it Sounds, 14 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 138 (1986), wherein the author states: "Embryos have no
more 'right to life' than do fish, horses, or pigs. But that does not mean that we cannot legally
protect embryos because of what they represent to us." Id. at 139 (emphasis in original).
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have support obligations.1"'
Another area in which the Davis decision may pose legal problems
is inheritance law. As advances in cryopreservation technology extend
the time that an embryo can be stored, the likelihood that one, or both,
of the biological parents will die prior to the birth of an IVF embryo
increases. The possibility of an IVF embryo being born years, or even
decades, after the death of its parents presents enormous practical diffi-
culties in the administration of the gamete donors' estates. 1 '
The Davis decision also raises the question of what happens when
both of the gamete donors desire to have the embryo destroyed. Pre-
sumably, a woman would not waive her right to abort a fetus after
implantation.16 2 Thus, the state's interest in protecting the conceptus
could be thwarted by the woman implanting the embryo and, if a preg-
nancy resulted, aborting the fetus.
Similarly, a divorce situation in which both parties desire to have
the embryo brought to term would present problems under Davis. If
the male donor has remarried and the new wife's chances of having a
baby through the use of IVF are greater than the female donor's, who
would receive the embryo? Presumably, if the state is primarily con-
cerned with protecting the interests of the embryo, it should be im-
planted in the person with the greater chance of bringing it to term.
Thus, a female donor willing to implant the embryo would be denied
the opportunity.
These issues cannot presently be resolved. IVF presents extremely
complex legal and moral issues which must be addressed by either state
legislatures or the courts. Although the desirability of legislative inter-
vention at this early stage in the development of IVF is questionable,
even more troubling is the prospect of necessarily ad hoc judicial deci-
sions concerning the rights and obligations of IVF participants.
At present, couples contemplating IVF, as well as the clinics ad-
150. See Pamela P. v. Frank S., l10 Misc. 2d 978, 443 N.Y.S.2d 343 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1981) (fact that the unmarried mother of a child had intentionally deceived the father into believ-
ing that she was using contraception does not relieve the father of child support obligations if the
mother is financially unable to provide the child with a standard of living equal to that of the
father). See also Robertson, supra note 113, at 8.
151. See Andrews, supra note 32, at 392-94.
152. E.g., In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1987) (clause in surrogate parenting contract prohibiting abortion except as allowed by the male
promisor held violative of the female surrogate's constitutional right to an abortion and, thus, void
and unenforceable).
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ministering it, are unsure of the "rules of the game." 153 Consequently,
couples and clinics alike are forced to resort to the courts both to en-
force their rights and to determine what those rights are.
The unknown status of the IVF embryo is an example of "[liaw,
marching with medicine but in the rear and limping a little."1 5 4 It is a
situation in desperate need of very cautious, very deliberate, legislative
action.
David P. Martin
Editor's Note
After this note was accepted for publication, Davis was reversed
by the Court of Appeals of Tennessee. Davis v. Davis, 59 U.S.L.W.
2205, 1990 WL 130807 (No. 180 Tenn. App. Sept. 13, 1990). Ignoring
the trial court's findings of fact and reversing the trial court's findings
of law, the appellate court held that the Davises share an equal inter-
est in the embryos. Id., 59 U.S.L.W. at 2206. Pursuant to Tennessee
Code of Appellate Procedure Rule 11, Mrs. Davis filed an Application
for Permission to Appeal with the Tennessee Supreme Court. A ruling
on the application is expected before December 1990,
153. Most clinics require the gamete donors to sign an agreement regarding the disposition
of embryos upon dissolution of the marriage, death of one of the partners, etc. E.g., University
Hospital [of Arkansas] In Vitro Fertilization Program Human Embryo Cryopreservation Pro-
gram: Control and Disposition of Embryo(s) Statement (available from The University Hospital
of Arkansas, Little Rock, Ark.). However, the enforceability of these agreements is untested and
unknown.
154. Kirby, Medical Technology and New Frontiers of Family Law, 14 L. MED. &
HEALTH CARE 113 (1987) (quoting Mount Isa Mines Ltd. v. Pusey, 125 C.L.R. 383 (1970)).
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